From my old blog-Friday, August 18, 2006
The peace talks currently underway between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are the best opportunity in over a decade to end the twenty-year war in northern Uganda.
The involvement of South Sudan government as a mediator in this process, gives this process serious potential to succeed in both ending active violence and providing a framework to address deeper social and political grievances
However, what we are seeing now is an apparent end to the evident openness of the LRA and GoU to end the conflict that was exhibit at the beginning of talks.
It is over a month since the talks started and no serious issues have been arrived at and it is to that end that we undertake this analysis, to ask the government of Uganda and the LRA to refocus priority.
In the current GoU-LRA peace talks in Juba, we do not even know the issues of contention. For example, we do not know the government position on economic empowering of the north and its rehabilitation plans.
All we hear of is a “soft landing for LRA.” And the rebels prioritising post-conflict security and livelihood guarantees. The two parties seem not ready to address the multifaceted root causes underpinning the conflict in East and Northern Uganda.
The LRA support networks, scattered in small groups in the Diaspora, should not use the growing media attention, to expose what they believe are the injustices of the present government and gain reparations for past ills.
Coupled with this has been little public attempt to date to interrogate the interests and stakes of those involved in these peace talks. Such analysis is crucial to unpack the potentiality of this peace process and to clarify the short and long term needs for lasting peace in northern Uganda.
It is high time the government must consider several possible outcomes. First, the government must reflect on the needs of people in the north for peace.
President Museveni made it clear both in his campaign manifesto that restoration of peace in the north would be his priority and we think this is a chance for him to do just that.
Government should also consider whether it is willing to facilitate national dialogue and truth-telling mechanisms.
Lasting peace in northern Uganda will require not only disbanding LRA structure, but also addressing northern grievances of social, political and economic marginalisation.
Friday, 18 August 2006
Tuesday, 15 August 2006
Juba Talks-what is at stake
From my old blog-Tuesday,August 15, 2006
On-going Juba talks are the best opportunity in over a decade to end one of Africa’s longest running wars. Yet, the stance of each team is threatening to undermine opportunities to help end one of the world’s worst humanitarian nightmares.
Talks between Ugandan negotiators and representatives of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels in Juba, southern Sudan came to a halt last week as the LRA delegation stormed out of the talks protesting government refusal to declare a cessation of hostilities.
The first round of talks ended without much progress after the LRA delegation demanded a ceasefire and also accused government of human-rights violation in the north.
Joseph Kony, LRA leader declare a unilateral ceasefire last week, however, Ugandan government has not reciprocated on the ceasefire declaration, insisting that it will agree to one only after a comprehensive peace agreement is singed.
Because of this mistrust, the LRA is said to have relocated its headquarters for fear of attack by Ugandan army, especially since its location is now well known to Kampala following recent confidence building visits by various government functionaries.
The greatest weakness of the Juba talks is now seen as the failure of the Chief mediator, Riek Machar, to insist on ceasefire declaration by both parties, this is the fourth item on the table that is yet to be agreed upon.
By its own initiative, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) agreed to mediate and host peace talks between the warring parties in May this year. The involvement of such a strategic third party mediator, combined with apparent openness of both parties to end the war gives this process serious potential to succeed.
However there is a lot at stake in this peace process and the might be missed opportunity in this talks begins with the GoSS.
The GoSS has much to gain from peacefully expelling the LRA from within its borders. Elements of the northern-based National Islamic Front regime could easily resume using the LRA as a proxy militia to destabilise the South and derail the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
The Khartoum government has been quiet about the ongoing peace talks since it started on July 14th.
Further, the LRA is embedded within networks in southern Sudan that have not yet joined the Southern Sudanese government coalition. The GoSS is thus keen to ameliorate the threat and demobilise the LRA through diplomatic means.
The LRA recognises the stakes for its top five lieutenants and also wants to avoid military confrontation with regional forces, the African Union (AU) and the UN to an extent that its cultic leader Joseph Kony and his Deputy Vincent Otti avoided peace talks’ venue for fear of being arrested and whisk off to the Hague.
International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments issued last October for top five LRA commanders have generated new pressure, though not enough will to actually execute warrants. Indicted LRA leadership want guarantees for their post-conflict security and livelihood.
As talks get underway, elevated attention by the United States and donor countries could be decisive to their success. However, The US State Department who announced two months ago that ending the war by end of 2006 was a priority of the Bush Administration has been unclear about its position on the Juba talks.
The US role is most desired as a non-signatory to the ICC, the United States may be able to impact the talks in ways that European countries cannot. The European countries, for their part, can urge the ICC to show restraint and to employ Article 53 of the Rome Statute. Under Article 53(4), the Prosecutor can reconsider a decision at any time “based on new facts or information.”
The GoSS, Kampala government and LRA leadership say that ICC continued disapproval of talks could derail the process when discussions shift to post-conflict security guarantees.
The unknown position of the international community and US also cast a shadow on source of finances resources that will be needed for implementation of peace agreements. The return of displaced peoples, compensation of victims and reintegration of rebel fighters will require extensive international support.
However, for President Yoweri Museveni’s government, the crisis has become an increasing liability for the reputation of the Ugandan government. With Museveni’s repeal of term limits to win a third term in elections, his regime has suffered a significant fall from grace.
Ending the war would not only redeem Museveni’s image abroad, but deal with the rejection his government has met in north for last 20 years. Success of the talks before the 2007 Commonwealth meetings to be held in Uganda would also be an accomplished for the Kampala government.
Museveni has made clear that he will offer amnesty to all rebels if the peace talks succeed within the stipulated period that ends September 12.
While Humanitarian bodies have criticised this as undermining the ICC, northern Ugandan leaders have expressed full support, conveying that long-term issues of justice can be addressed after the cessation of violence.
Acholi Paramount Chief senior aid told The EastAfrican that once the basic rights to their people have been restored, local leaders will help set the agenda for long-term restoration, using traditional restorative justice mechanisms.
The Acholi culture already has a built in mechanism, Mato Oput, to deal with reconciliation. Mato Oput is a process usually facilitated by Rwodi (clan leaders) in which the person who has wronged another or others gives a truthful account of the wrongs, accepts responsibility for what they have done, and makes a gesture of restitution in the form of something physical.
After this gesture is accepted by the aggrieved party, the two share a drink made of bitter herbs in front of witnesses to seal that reconciliation has occurred.
In the ongoing negotiations, the government and LRA will have to consider issues of reconciliation, truth telling and even some form of power sharing. While structural change is unlikely, Northern leaders say all parties should be supportive of the processes that build trust and relationships between segments of society that have been polarized and separated for several generations.
According to parliamentarians from the north and cultural leaders, lasting peace in northern Uganda will require addressing northern marginalization.
The war in northern Uganda has persisted for twenty years and has been described by U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland as “One of the worst forgotten conflicts in the world, and worse in magnitude than that of Darfur or Iraq.”
As a result, any form of economic activity has been brought to a grinding halt. A whole culture, people, and their environment are being systematically destroyed by Uganda’s government counter-insurgency policy.
Human development indicators in the north have gone into a free fall: 95percent of population lives below poverty line, 70% of them in absolute poverty. This is a contrast with the situation in the Southern and Western Uganda where 37 percent live below poverty line.
“This situation cannot continue without serious action being taken to reverse the fortunes of Northern Uganda for the better. It is also a threat to peace and stability in Great Lakes region” said Betty Amongin, a legislator from the North
However in the 20 years of conflict there have been opportunities for resolution. Even greater opportunities have existed for conflict management, which could reduce the destructiveness of this confrontation.
One could even go as far as to say that the continuation of this conflict is the legacy of missed opportunities. The peace talks of 1988, Operation North in 1991, the Bigombe talks of 1994 are all examples of missed opportunities that had the potential to end this conflict.
The Government undertook a number of operations to end this insurgency in its initial phase including mobilisation of civilian population to form defense units. Lack of technical competence in the armed forces to deal with insurgency is said to have prevented complete victory.
The LRA, now based in Garamba, DR Congo have terrorised the northern population to challenge the Ugandan government and sustain its existence. It has abducted more than 25,000 children, using them as cannon fodder and sexual slaves and displaced 1.6million.
On-going Juba talks are the best opportunity in over a decade to end one of Africa’s longest running wars. Yet, the stance of each team is threatening to undermine opportunities to help end one of the world’s worst humanitarian nightmares.
Talks between Ugandan negotiators and representatives of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels in Juba, southern Sudan came to a halt last week as the LRA delegation stormed out of the talks protesting government refusal to declare a cessation of hostilities.
The first round of talks ended without much progress after the LRA delegation demanded a ceasefire and also accused government of human-rights violation in the north.
Joseph Kony, LRA leader declare a unilateral ceasefire last week, however, Ugandan government has not reciprocated on the ceasefire declaration, insisting that it will agree to one only after a comprehensive peace agreement is singed.
Because of this mistrust, the LRA is said to have relocated its headquarters for fear of attack by Ugandan army, especially since its location is now well known to Kampala following recent confidence building visits by various government functionaries.
The greatest weakness of the Juba talks is now seen as the failure of the Chief mediator, Riek Machar, to insist on ceasefire declaration by both parties, this is the fourth item on the table that is yet to be agreed upon.
By its own initiative, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) agreed to mediate and host peace talks between the warring parties in May this year. The involvement of such a strategic third party mediator, combined with apparent openness of both parties to end the war gives this process serious potential to succeed.
However there is a lot at stake in this peace process and the might be missed opportunity in this talks begins with the GoSS.
The GoSS has much to gain from peacefully expelling the LRA from within its borders. Elements of the northern-based National Islamic Front regime could easily resume using the LRA as a proxy militia to destabilise the South and derail the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
The Khartoum government has been quiet about the ongoing peace talks since it started on July 14th.
Further, the LRA is embedded within networks in southern Sudan that have not yet joined the Southern Sudanese government coalition. The GoSS is thus keen to ameliorate the threat and demobilise the LRA through diplomatic means.
The LRA recognises the stakes for its top five lieutenants and also wants to avoid military confrontation with regional forces, the African Union (AU) and the UN to an extent that its cultic leader Joseph Kony and his Deputy Vincent Otti avoided peace talks’ venue for fear of being arrested and whisk off to the Hague.
International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments issued last October for top five LRA commanders have generated new pressure, though not enough will to actually execute warrants. Indicted LRA leadership want guarantees for their post-conflict security and livelihood.
As talks get underway, elevated attention by the United States and donor countries could be decisive to their success. However, The US State Department who announced two months ago that ending the war by end of 2006 was a priority of the Bush Administration has been unclear about its position on the Juba talks.
The US role is most desired as a non-signatory to the ICC, the United States may be able to impact the talks in ways that European countries cannot. The European countries, for their part, can urge the ICC to show restraint and to employ Article 53 of the Rome Statute. Under Article 53(4), the Prosecutor can reconsider a decision at any time “based on new facts or information.”
The GoSS, Kampala government and LRA leadership say that ICC continued disapproval of talks could derail the process when discussions shift to post-conflict security guarantees.
The unknown position of the international community and US also cast a shadow on source of finances resources that will be needed for implementation of peace agreements. The return of displaced peoples, compensation of victims and reintegration of rebel fighters will require extensive international support.
However, for President Yoweri Museveni’s government, the crisis has become an increasing liability for the reputation of the Ugandan government. With Museveni’s repeal of term limits to win a third term in elections, his regime has suffered a significant fall from grace.
Ending the war would not only redeem Museveni’s image abroad, but deal with the rejection his government has met in north for last 20 years. Success of the talks before the 2007 Commonwealth meetings to be held in Uganda would also be an accomplished for the Kampala government.
Museveni has made clear that he will offer amnesty to all rebels if the peace talks succeed within the stipulated period that ends September 12.
While Humanitarian bodies have criticised this as undermining the ICC, northern Ugandan leaders have expressed full support, conveying that long-term issues of justice can be addressed after the cessation of violence.
Acholi Paramount Chief senior aid told The EastAfrican that once the basic rights to their people have been restored, local leaders will help set the agenda for long-term restoration, using traditional restorative justice mechanisms.
The Acholi culture already has a built in mechanism, Mato Oput, to deal with reconciliation. Mato Oput is a process usually facilitated by Rwodi (clan leaders) in which the person who has wronged another or others gives a truthful account of the wrongs, accepts responsibility for what they have done, and makes a gesture of restitution in the form of something physical.
After this gesture is accepted by the aggrieved party, the two share a drink made of bitter herbs in front of witnesses to seal that reconciliation has occurred.
In the ongoing negotiations, the government and LRA will have to consider issues of reconciliation, truth telling and even some form of power sharing. While structural change is unlikely, Northern leaders say all parties should be supportive of the processes that build trust and relationships between segments of society that have been polarized and separated for several generations.
According to parliamentarians from the north and cultural leaders, lasting peace in northern Uganda will require addressing northern marginalization.
The war in northern Uganda has persisted for twenty years and has been described by U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland as “One of the worst forgotten conflicts in the world, and worse in magnitude than that of Darfur or Iraq.”
As a result, any form of economic activity has been brought to a grinding halt. A whole culture, people, and their environment are being systematically destroyed by Uganda’s government counter-insurgency policy.
Human development indicators in the north have gone into a free fall: 95percent of population lives below poverty line, 70% of them in absolute poverty. This is a contrast with the situation in the Southern and Western Uganda where 37 percent live below poverty line.
“This situation cannot continue without serious action being taken to reverse the fortunes of Northern Uganda for the better. It is also a threat to peace and stability in Great Lakes region” said Betty Amongin, a legislator from the North
However in the 20 years of conflict there have been opportunities for resolution. Even greater opportunities have existed for conflict management, which could reduce the destructiveness of this confrontation.
One could even go as far as to say that the continuation of this conflict is the legacy of missed opportunities. The peace talks of 1988, Operation North in 1991, the Bigombe talks of 1994 are all examples of missed opportunities that had the potential to end this conflict.
The Government undertook a number of operations to end this insurgency in its initial phase including mobilisation of civilian population to form defense units. Lack of technical competence in the armed forces to deal with insurgency is said to have prevented complete victory.
The LRA, now based in Garamba, DR Congo have terrorised the northern population to challenge the Ugandan government and sustain its existence. It has abducted more than 25,000 children, using them as cannon fodder and sexual slaves and displaced 1.6million.
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